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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
All parties to this proceeding are identified in the caption. Appellant, the Plaintiff 
below, is Ilia Dennis. Appellee, the Defendant below, is David Vasquez. 
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3. This is an appeal by PlaintifffAppellant from a final order granting summary 
judgment in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error in finding that the claims preclusion 
branch of res judicata prevents Appellant from bringing a subsequent claim for personal 
injury after first losing on the merits in small claims court in a property damage claim with 
both claims arising out of the same automobile accident? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 56; Ault v. Holden. 44 P.3d 781, 787 (Utah 2002). 
The reviewing court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any grounds 
available to the trial court even if it is not one relied upon below. Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County. 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993). 
In an appeal from a summary judgment the Court may reject arguments not made at 
the trial level. Olson v. Park & Craig Olsen. Inc.. 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 23, 2001, Ilia Dennis (hereinafter "Dennis"), while represented by 
counsel (R. 65; Addendum A), filed a small claims action against Appellee David Vasquez 
(hereinafter "Vasquez") (Case No. 01820063) (Addendum B) to collect property damages 
arising out of an automobile collision which occurred on October 6, 2000. (R. 20.) At the 
small claims hearing the court entered a judgment of "no cause of action." (R. 20; 
Addendum C.) 
Dennis brought this action on July 26, 2001 in the Third District Court for personal 
injuries claimed to be sustained in the same motor vehicle accident with Vasquez occurring 
on October 6, 2000. (R. 2.) 
Vasquez filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the res judicata 
barred Dennis from splitting his cause of actions and filing a lawsuit twice for the same 
accident. (R. 27-39.) Specifically, it was argued that the claims preclusion branch of res 
judicata was a bar to Dennis bringing a second lawsuit based upon the same accident and 
occurrence. 
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Dennis argued that the elements of the claims preclusion branch of res judicata had 
not been met. (R. 40-47.) Dennis alleged that the judgment of the small claims court was 
not on the merits and further argued that negligence issues had not been litigated. (R. 40-47, 
95.) 
On March 22,2002, the Third District Court issued a memorandum decision granting 
the motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of the claims preclusion branch of 
res judicata and held that Dennis' claim was therefore barred. (R. 74-78.) On May 6,2002, 
the court entered an order granting summary judgment based upon its memorandum decision. 
(R. 79-83; Addendum D.) Dennis filed a notice of appeal on May 24, 2002. (R. 84-85.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On October 6, 2000, Dennis was involved in an automobile collision with 
Vasquez at the intersection of 14400 South and Pony Express Road in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. As a result of the collision Dennis claims he sustained bodily injuries and 
property damage to his vehicle. (R. 2-3; Addendum B) 
2. On February 23,2001, Dennis, with his counsel's paralegal present (R. 95, p. 
13, lines 9-22) filed a small claims action for property damage arising out of the October 6, 
2000, collision with Dennis. (Addendum B) 
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3. Dennis was at all times represented by counsel for the accident of October 6, 
2000. The attorney's paralegal went with Dennis to the small claims trial. (R. 65; R. 95, p. 
2, lines 20-25; p. 3, lines 1-8; p. 12, lines 10-25; p. 13, lines 1-25.) 
4. On March 29, 2001, the small claims court entered judgment indicating "no 
cause of action" against Dennis and in favor of Vasquez. (R. 30; Addendum C.) 
5. At the time the small claims lawsuit was filed on March 29,2001, Dennis had 
already completed his medical treatment for the October 6, 2000, accident as of December 
22, 2000. (R. 66; Addendum E.)1 
6. Vasquez did not file any appeal from the small claims judgment. (R. 1-95.) 
7. On July 19,2001, Dennis filed, with "of counsel" of the same firm he had at 
the time of the small claims trial, a second lawsuit, this time claiming personal injury 
damages. (R. 1-4, 65, 95.) 
1
 Addendum E was served on Vasquez in this lawsuit as part of Dennis' initial 
disclosures on November 30, 2002. (R. 16,46.) Addendum E is a summary of medical 
expenses incurred by Dennis for treatment as of November 30, 2001, when the initial 
disclosures were served. Dennis' medical expenses as shown in Addendum E clearly 
indicate the last medical treatment Dennis received was on December 22, 2000. The 
treatment claimed as the medical expenses incurred in the present lawsuit already existed 
and had been incurred at the time Dennis filed his small claims action on February 23, 
2001.) (Addendum B,E.) 
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8. On December 12,2001, a motion for summary judgment was filed by Vasquez 
claiming Dennis' claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Under the claims 
preclusion branch of res judicata Dennis argued the small claims judgment was final and on 
the merits, that the parties were identical, and that all of Dennis' claims from the October 6, 
2000, accident could have and should have been filed in one lawsuit at the same time. (R. 
27-47.) 
9. On December 24, 2001, Dennis filed his opposition arguing that the issues 
were not identical, the small claims judgment was not final, and that equity principles 
applied. (R. 40-47.) 
10. A hearing with argument was held at the trial court on March 18, 2002. (R. 
95.) 
11. On March 22,2002, the trial court issued a memorandum decision granting the 
Vasquez's motion for summary judgment. (R. 74-78.) 
12. The court entered a final order which was filed on March 23,2002. (R. 79-82; 
Addendum D.) Dennis filed a notice of appeal on May 23, 2002. (R. 84-85.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Dennis brought two separate actions, one for property damage and the other for 
personal injuries. Both actions arose out of the same automobile accident of October 6, 
2000. 
At the time Dennis brought his small claims action on February 23, 2001, he was 
represented by counsel and had completed his medical treatment for the accident. (R. 65, 
66.) The Small Claims Court entered a judgment indicating "no cause of action." However, 
Dennis failed to combine into one lawsuit his claims for personal injury and property 
damage. 
Dennis thereafter filed this action in the Third District Court in which the court 
granted summary judgment on the grounds of claims preclusion. 
Under Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), the claims preclusion branch 
of res judicata bars the present action for personal injuries because (1) both cases involve the 
same parties; (2) Dennis could have brought in a court of competent jurisdiction both the 
personal injury and the property damage claims; and (3) the small claims court entered a 
judgment for "no cause of action" which became a final judgment on the merits. 
Dennis' argument about an "equity" exception does not apply as Dennis had a legal 
remedy to file in a court of competent jurisdiction and failed to do so. This is not a case 
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similar to authority cited in Dennis' brief where no attorneys are allowed in Small Claims 
Court and Dennis brought an action before medical bills were incurred. The opposite is true. 
Dennis was represented and had fully completed treatment prior to filing the small claims 
action for personal injuries. Instead of filing the appropriate lawsuit for all claims Dennis 
attempted to make a claim on property damage already resolved. It was an attempt by Dennis 
to misuse the courts that has caused his claims to be barred rather than some unjust system. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS PRECLUSION BRANCH OF RES 
JUDICATA. 
Dennis failed to assert his claim for bodily injury in the Small Claims Court 
proceeding. Dennis is barred by the res judicata branch known as claim preclusion. 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only if the suit in which that cause of action 
is being asserted and the prior suit satisfy the following requirements: 
1. Both cases must involve the same parties or their privies; 
2. The claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit 
or must have been one that could and should have been raised in the first 
action; and 
3. The first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
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Madsen v. Borthick, supra. (Emphasis added). 
A. Both Lawsuits Involved The Same Parties Or Their Privies 
The first element requiring that both cases involve the same parties or their privies is 
unquestionably met in the subject case. Ilia Dennis was the Plaintiff and David Vasquez was 
the Defendant in both lawsuits filed in district court and the lawsuit filed in Small Claims 
Court. Both cases arise out the events of the October 6, 2000, automobile accident. 
B. The Third District Court Lawsuit For Personal Injuries Could Have And 
Should Have Been Brought At The Time The Small Claims Lawsuit Was 
Contemplated 
The second element of Madsen. supra., requiring that the claim alleged to be barred 
must have been either (1) presented in the first suit, or (2) must be one that should and could 
have been raised in the first action, has also been met. 
Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988), 
defines a claim or cause of action as: 
A claim is the situation or state of facts which entitles a party to sustain 
an action and gives them the right to seek judicial interference on his 
behalf. A claim petitions a court to award a remedy for injury suffered 
by the plaintiff. A cause of action is necessarily comprised of specific 
elements which must be proven before relief is granted. A claim or 
cause of action is resolved by judicial pronouncement providing or 
denying the requested remedy. 
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Dennis' claims for personal injury were not asserted in the small claims action. The 
small claims lawsuit specifically requests damages for property. (Addendum B.) However, 
the injury claims could and should have been raised because they arose from the same events 
and occurrences as the property damage claim. Utah courts have specifically held that small 
claims courts have subject matter jurisdiction over personal injury claims. Kawamoto v. 
Fratto, 994 P.2d 187 (Utah 2000). Furthermore, the action could have been brought in the 
district court combining all the damages sought from the one accident. 
In American Estate Mgmt. Corp. v. International 986 P.2d 765 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), 
the appellant filed an adverse possession claim for ownership of a parking lot. The 
appellant's suit was the second suit it had filed to determine the property rights of the parties 
regarding the parking lot. The court analyzed the issue of claim preclusion based on the three 
elements stated in Madsen, supra. The court found that the appellant could and should have 
brought the adverse possession claim in the first suit. The court stated that claim preclusion 
reflects the expectation of the parties who are given the capacity to present their "entire 
controversies" shall in fact do so in the same action. 
Restatement of the Law, Second, Judgments § 24, has been adopted in Utah. See 
Rinswood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (cert 
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990)). 
9 
Restatement of the Law, Second, Judgments § 24, states : 
(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes 
the appellant's claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar (see §§18, 
19), the claim extinguished includes all rights of the appellant to 
remedies against the appellee with respect to all or any part of the 
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the 
action arose. 
(2) What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction," and what 
groupings constitute a "series," are to be determined pragmatically, 
giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in 
time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial 
unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' 
expectations or business understanding or usage. 
(emphasis added) 
Clearly section 24 of the Restatements of Judgments contemplates that when someone 
is involved in an automobile accident, claims that arise out of the same set of operative facts 
constitute a "transaction," and that all the remedies that arise out of such transaction must be 
sought in the first lawsuit. Otherwise Dennis could first bring an action for damage to his 
car, then an action for loss of use, then medical bills, lost of income, etc. The purpose of the 
claims preclusion doctrine is to ensure that Dennis brings all his claims in one in one suit so 
that such claims can be finalized and for the sake of judicial economy. 
In the comments and illustrations to section 24 of the Restatement of Judgments, the 
same basic fact pattern as has occurred in the present case was illustrated. 
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Illustrations: 
1. A and B, driving their respective cars, have a collision injuring A 
and damaging his car. The occurrence is single, and so is A's claim. 
If A obtains a judgment against B on the ground of negligence for the 
damage to the car, he is prevented by the doctrine of merger from 
subsequently maintaining an action for the harm to his person. 
2. The facts are the same as in Illustration 1, except that B obtains a 
judgment on the ground that A has failed to prove B's negligence. The 
preclusion is the same, but explained by the doctrine of bar. 
Restatements of Judgments Second, § 24, Illustrations 1 and 2. 
The same fact pattern above is what occurred with Dennis in the present case. 
Dennis sued for property damages in Small Claims Court and at trial a "no cause of action" 
judgment was entered. He is bared from bringing a second action for different damages 
from the same automobile accident. 
Restatements of Judgment, § 24 also includes in the comments § g. 
g. When the jurisdiction of the court is limited. The rule stated in this 
Section as to splitting a claim is applicable although the first action is 
brought in a court which has no jurisdiction to give a judgment for 
more than a designated amount. When the plaintiff brings an action in 
such a court and recovers judgment for the maximum amount which the 
court can award, he is precluded from thereafter maintaining an action 
for the balance of his claim. See Illustrations 13 and 15. It is assumed 
here that a court was available to the plaintiff in the same system of 
courts - say a court of general jurisdiction in the same state - where he 
could have sued for the entire amount. 
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The comments of Restatements § 24 includes the following illustrations regarding the 
above: 
Illustration: 
13. A bring an action against B for negligently causing his personal 
injury. Instead of suing in a court of general jurisdiction of the state, A 
brings his action in a court which has no jurisdiction to give a judgment 
for more than $500. At the trial A's damages are assessed at $1,000. 
Judgment is given for A for $500. A cannot maintain an action against 
B to recover further damages. 
14. In an automobile collision, A is injured and his car damages as a 
result of the negligence of B. Instead of suing in a court of general 
jurisdiction of the state, A brings his action for the damage to his car 
in a justice's court, which has jurisdiction in actions for damage to 
property but has no jurisdiction in actions for injury to the person. 
Judgment is rendered for A for the damage to the car. A cannot 
thereafter maintain an action against B to recover for the injury to 
his person arising out of the same collision. (Emphasis added.) 
Dennis cannot split his cause of action for the accident of October 6,2000. When he 
brought his lawsuit for property damage in Small Claims Court he was obligated to at the 
same time bring an action for personal injuries even if it meant that he had to sue in a 
different court, such as the Third District Court, in order to obtain complete relief. At the 
time of the filing of the lawsuit in Small Claims Court Dennis had already incurred personal 
injuries and all of the medical expenses that are now being claimed in this lawsuit. (R. 66; 
Addendum E.) The medical log showing all the medical expenses predating the small claims 
action was produced by Dennis in his initial disclosures in this case. (R. 46.) 
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The Supreme Court of Utah has prohibited splitting causes of actions. In Ravmer v. 
Hi-Line Transport. Inc.. 15 Utah 2d. 427, 394 P.2d 383 (Utah 1964), the court denied a 
Dennis' attempt to institute two actions in two separate proceedings - one for his property 
damage and one for his personal injuries. The court stated: 
In a substantial majority of jurisdictions, a single act causing 
simultaneous injury to the physical person and property of one 
individual is held to give rise to only one cause of action, and not to 
separate causes based, on the one hand, on the personal injury, and on 
the other the property loss. 
Id. 
The court emphasized that the rule against splitting causes of action benefits both 
appellants (freeing them of delay and burdensome expense) and appellees (relieving them 
of the injustice of being subjected to more than one suit for a single tort). Id. The court also 
found the rule to be in harmony with public policy because it promoted judicial economy by 
eliminating the possibility of a multiplicity of suits. 
Likewise, in Seale v. Gowans. et al.. 923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996), the court stated that, 
"once injury results there is but a single tort and not a series of separate torts, one for each 
resultant harm . . . [A] plaintiff may not split this cause of action by seeking damages for 
some of his injuries in one suit and for later-developing injuries in another." 
13 
In the majority of jurisdictions the law will not allow splitting a cause of action into 
a separate property damage and personal injury claim.2 
In the case at hand, Dennis had the opportunity to bring his claim of bodily injury in 
the small claims action. His claims of property damage and bodily injury arose out of the 
same event, the October 6, 2000 automobile accident. He failed to assert his bodily injury 
claims at the same time he sued for property damage, and is now be precluded from bringing 
Vasquez into a second forum to litigate those claims. 
2
 Kirchnerv.Riherd. 702 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1985) (where an appellant sued for 
property damage and loss of use for his automobile in Small Claims Court and then 
attempted to bring his bodily injury claim in a higher court because the personal injury 
exceeded the small claims jurisdiction and notwithstanding that the trial court did not 
reach the question of liability for negligence the claim was barred by the previously filed 
action in Small Claims Court); Donahue v. American Family Mut. Cas. Co.. 380 N.W.2d 
437 (Iowa App. 1985) (where an insured had brought an earlier action against an insured 
in Small Claims Court and that action had been dismissed with a finding that the insured 
was not negligent; both actions arose out of the same automobile collision and out of the 
insurer's resulting duties under the insurance policy, the subsequent action was barred); 
Landry v. Lucher. 976 P.2d 1274 (Wash. App. 1999) (where the court precluding splitting 
a cause of action where the plaintiff brought a small claims action for property damage 
related claims and later attempted similar claims and medical expense claims in a court of 
higher jurisdiction); Pretz v. Lamont 626 P.2d 806 (Kan. App. 1981), the appellate court 
affirmed dismissal of a subsequent action for injuries where appellant had already 
obtained a judgment for property damage; McKibben v. Zamora, 358 So.2d 866 (Fla. 
App. 1978), the appellate court disallows the splits of property damage action and 
personal injury action arising out of the same accident and specifically held that res 
judicata applies even if plaintiff had not met "threshold" for filing a personal injury claim 
at the time the property damage claim was filed. 
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C. The Small Claims Judgment Is Final And On The Merits 
Under Madsen, supra., the third requirement for claim preclusion is that there be a 
final judgment on the merits in the prior action. Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedures defines judgment as "a decree and in the order from which an appeal lies." 
Under claim preclusion, there is no requirement that the common issue to both actions 
actually be litigated. Whether the judgment is by trial or from a motion to dismiss that is 
granted with prejudice, or by summary judgment, the resulting judgment would be on the 
merits. Conderv.Hunt 1 P.3d 558 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
In the instant case, a judgment was entered and an appeal was available to Dennis. 
The Small Claims Court entered judgment on the merits based on the finding of no cause of 
action. 
II. EQUITY DOES NOT FAVOR ALLOWING THIS APPELLANT AN 
EXCEPTION TO THE CLAIMS PRECLUSION DOCTRINE. 
Dennis argues that the Court, under equitable principles, should carve out an 
exception to the claims preclusion branch of res judicata for small claims actions. 
Dennis' argument is essentially based on a minority of jurisdictions that have provided 
such an exception. Dennis cites several cases including Isaac v. Truck Services, Inc., 253 
Conn. 418 (Conn. 2000). 
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However, the facts of those cases and Isaac are substantially different from the present 
case. Isaac was decided on the basis that the plaintiff had not yet treated for personal injuries 
before her property damage claim was brought in Small Claims Court two weeks after the 
accident. Isaac, at 419. The court was basing its decision in Isaac on the fact that there was 
no injury claim yet to be asserted at the time the small claims action was filed. 
Furthermore, in Isaac the court pointed to the fact that public policy in Connecticut 
had already provided for a limited exception to the claims preclusion doctrine "based on 
claims between married persons." Isaac, at 420. 
The present case is entirely different. In Utah the public policy is to not allow claims 
to be split nor to provide exceptions to the claims preclusion doctrine. See, Raymer, supra.: 
International, supra. 
Furthermore, the facts in the present case strongly suggest Dennis should not be 
granted "equity" to carve out a limited exception. 
Prior to filing the small claims action, Dennis had retained the very attorneys who 
represented him in the present case. (R.65; R. 66, p. 2, lines 20-25; p. 3, lines 1-8; p. 12, 
lines 10-25, p. 13, lines 1-25.) In fact, Dennis' paralegal went with him to the small claims 
action as an interpreter. (R. 95, p. 13.) Dennis most certainly could have brought his lawsuit 
for injuries. A cause of action accrues at the time of the accident regardless of whether 
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plaintiff has sustained sufficient medical expenses to meet threshold. See Jepson v. State. 
846 P.2d 485 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the small claims 
action Dennis had not only been treating but had finished treating. (R. 66; Addendum E.) 
Prior to the small claims action, liability was in dispute between Dennis' attorneys 
and Vasquez. (R. 65; Addendum A.) Regardless of the dispute, Dennis received some 
$4,650 for his property damage claims. (R. 30,35,79,95 p. 12, lines 1-19.) This represents 
80 percent of the property damage. (R. 95, p. 12, lines 1-19.) Dennis then attempted to sue 
for the remaining $1,227.35 in Small Claims Court. However, at Small Claims Court a "no 
cause of action" judgment was entered against Dennis. 
The significance of the above is clear. If Dennis had won the extra 20 percent liability 
he was seeking and a judgment had been entered on Dennis' behalf he would have been the 
one arguing and demanding from Vasquez 100 percent of the personal injury damages on the 
disputed liability. Instead, he lost at Small Claims Court and a final judgment was entered 
on the merits. 
Dennis is not being punished because of the inequity of the court system. Dennis 
claim is being precluded by res judicata because he tried to misuse the system. He tried to 
use the small claims process in an attempt to later argue he should get 100 percent of his 
injury damages. Now that such tactic has backfired, Dennis requests equity. This is hardly 
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the set of facts the court in Isaac, supra., found so compelling. At the time Dennis filed in 
Small Claims Court there was absolutely no reason why he could not have brought his 
personal injury claim other than he was attempting to manipulate the system. Dennis has 
"unclean hands" in his request for equity. 
In Donahue v. American Family Mut. Cas. Co.. 380 N.W.2d 437 (Ct. App. Iowa 
1985), the plaintiff brought two separate small claims actions based upon the same accident. 
The plaintiff was attempting to split his claims against different parties and lost both small 
claims actions for property damage related claims. The plaintiff did not appeal the small 
claims judgments. The plaintiff then filed a claim at the trial court level for property damage 
and medical expenses. The trial court granted summary judgment and the appeals court 
affirmed on the principle of claim preclusion. 
In Donahue, supra., at 439, the court held: 
We are not unmindful of the fact that plaintiff could not have brought 
an action for $10,000 in Small Claims Court. But that does not negate 
the legal principles requiring a party to put in issue and try his entire 
claim at one time and not litigate separate claims in separate actions. 
This outcome demonstrates the harsh results of a misuse of the small 
claims process. 
In Landry, supra., the appellate court did not allow the splitting of a cause of action 
into property and personal injury claims holding that the plaintiffs small claims action bars 
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a subsequent lawsuit for personal injuries under res judicata. The court in Landry dismissed 
plaintiffs equity arguments: 
The Landrys make several equitable arguments. Equitable remedies are 
not available unless the remedies at law are inadequate. Here the more-
than-adequate legal remedy was to join the personal injury claim with 
the property damage claim in a court with the jurisdictional authority 
to preside over both matters up to the full amount of damages in 
controversy. 
Landry, supra., at 785-86. 
Lastly, Dennis never argued that an exception should be carved out of res judicata for 
small claims and never listed his out-of-state cases in his docketing statement. Dennis should 
not now be allowed for the first time to argue that an "equity" exception should be provided. 
See Olson, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Madsen, supra.. Dennis essentially admits that under claim preclusion 
principles res judicata applies to bar Dennis' claims. 
Dennis argues rather that under equity principles he should be allowed to split his 
cause of action. However, under the facts of this case, even if equity is considered, Dennis 
cannot prevail. Dennis attempted to misuse the small claims process to litigate a claim for 
property damages which he knew had already been settled. He wanted to adjudicate the 
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remaining 20 percent of fault to use as an argument in his personal injury claim. When he 
lost he did not appeal and the judgment became final. Dennis had legal representation the 
entire time. Dennis had not only received medical treatment but had completed medical 
treatment before filing in Small Claims Court. There is no reason given the facts in this case 
why Dennis could not have brought his injury and property damage claims in one action. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that Dennis' appeal be denied based on the 
claims preclusion doctrine of res judicata. 
DATED this Ko day of December, 2002. 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
RICHARD K. GLAUSER 
ALBERT W. GRAY 
Attorneys for Vasquez 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Vasquez was 
mailed first class mail, postage prepaid, this I / day of December, 2002, to the following: 
Michael A. Katz, #3817 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
5664 South Green Street 
Murray, UT 84123 
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November 7, 2000 
Julio Sandoval 
STATE FARM INSURANCE 
2655 S Lake Erie Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 
LEGAL ASSISTANTS 
BRYANT E HANSON 
S ' E P H A N I E MASH 
BE T TY M CUMMOCK 
TAMMARA SMEPARD 
R U B E N MARTINEZ 
TONI A S NGwE 'ARY 
SANDY LEATHERBURY 
KATHY DUG DALE 
A N N LE 
J » Lw HAN SEN 
C A R L O S OJEDA 
BETTY JEAN HUTKIN 
CI NOY D I S R A E L I 
D E B R A PERDERBER 
C H R I S OGURA 
RE- Our Client*/"Ilia Dennis N 
Claim N o / 44 3082553 
DOL \_£>ctober 6, 2000 
J 
Dear Julio 
In response to your letter of November 2, 2000,1 have enclosed for your review a 
copy of our liability review attached with photos of the scene of the accident. 
Deputy Watkin's report expressed his opinion based on the scene observations and 
interviews with the two drivers and eyewitness He indicates that Vasquez's failure to yield the 
right of way caused the collision 
Karl Hayes the eyewitness who was stopped behind your insured at the stop sign, 
is remarkable only for his observation that he thought Mr Torrez was coming "a littlejfast'* (SR-
140 is posted for 45MPH) That is not evidence of speeding as you suggest 
It is clear that the proximate cause of the collision was the failure of your insured 
to see Mr Torrez approaching and his failure to yield the right of way Therefore, we request 
you review these items and make an accurate assessment of liability 
MRJ/jrm 
Sincerely, 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
Mitchell H Jensen \ 
HON 1 ' > m 
TabB 
n-*^ f * HAND DtLiVERED; 
-CAVED BY Third District Court, State of Utah /d^A A/^+«> 
.icCaVEDBY SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT '' 
AR 1 ?• ' ' 5022 South State Street, Murray, Utah 84107 
FMsisvwcwfcWR 1 3 2001 
Nam* ^-J-<t~//4 /J^AJA''^ , Plaintiff) 
Agent & Title 
Street Address #}£*>?•$ ?£& Y^ 
) SMALIrCLAlMS 
) AFFIDAVIT 
r i t y > n t r 7 ; r J * ,vA, . ^ 7 - g y * » ^ Phone j g g f c z i ^ AND ORDER ,* 
vs. 
\'a™« /J#-tf,r/ kn^S/si lk\<fsrr^ nefp„rlnr>t ) Case No. Q \ p - - > T " Q '&<-
' Social Securfty"TsTufnb"e'r"-J *„.'• '":'•"*".: ——:—'JUL ------- ' ") — " - - - - ~ v 
Agent & Title . _ _ ) 
Street Address ??/ £<->• M* A / ) 
City, State, Zip/^W>;' ^ 7 " " %V Phoned? / - ?&r?j 
v . AFFIDAVIT 
Plaintiff swears that the following is'true: 
(1) Defendant owes plaintiff $ plus a filing fee and a service fee. 
This debt arose on /jf&C*t 4r 2 0 / ^ ,ior:. .. __ -
"7 X ? XT' •/-/- r v 
7 J > ^ ^ r ^ V l ? ^ ^ ' ^ 
(2) Plaintiff has asked defendant to pay the debt, but it has not been paid. 
(3) Defendant resides OR the claim arose within the jurisdiction of this court. 
sS (/y^99^Vi'/ 
Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me on - V L 2 <
 v 20c' / _ . 
*Clerk, Deputy or Notary 
ORDER 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE DEFENDANT: 
You are directed to appear at a trial and answer the above claim on: 
Date: y - y ^ y g - t r ^ V * ^<^\ j7pT\ , Time ^ V ^ V ^ *Car^V- : ^ 
Place: 5022 South State Street, Murray, Utah 84107 (west entrance) 
Dated T - ^ - N 
;l 
J?X .20.CLL. ——Ht—^> - ^ N -
Clerk or Deputy 
Tf «*~* . * - - » -
TabC 
W' 
Hiix a District Court, State of Ltah 
Salt Lake County, Murray Department 
5022 South State Street, Murray, Utah 84107 
I l i a Dennis Plaintiff 
Name 
Agent & Title 
Street address 
City, State, Zip 




Social Security Number 
Agent & Title 
Street address 
City, State, Zip 
DATE OF TRIAL:. 
Daytime Phone 
S - 3 - 2 9 - 0 1 
PARTffiS APPEARING: tyl Plaintiff ^ Defendant 






Case No.. 0 1 8 2 0 0 6 6 3 
[ ] FOR DEFENDANT ON COUNTER AFFIDAVIT 
.Principal 
.Court Costs 
.Total Judgment, with interest at the current state post-judgment rate, until paid. 
4 . FOR DEFENDANT [ ] FOR PLAINTIFF ON COUNTER AFFIDAVIT 
V] No Cause of Action 
[ ] Dismissal with Prejudice (claim may not be refiled) 
[ ] Dismissal without Prejudice (claim may be refiled) 
lis judgment is effective for 8 \ears. 
this date I certify that I [ ] mailed 
^ 
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT 
(ORIGINAL TO BE FILED WITH COURT) 
[^delivered a copy of this Judgment to 
..20 0 i 
S»igi(atu3je of PersQidGTv 
RECEIVED 
APR 0 i 2001 
[ flCglaintifF [ X . Defendant 
Tvirip Nrit"i«~» ~tr J -
TabD 
Richard K. Glauser, #4324 
Albert W. Gray, #A6095 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (609) 466-4228 
Attorneys for Defendant 
FUEDEftgsriSICrciHJBT 
TWro Judicial District 
MAY - 6 2002 
/s^L^LAKECfauNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 







Civil No. 010906455 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The above-captioned case came before the Court pursuant to Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment on March 18, 2002. Albert W. Gray appeared on behalf of the 
moving party, the Defendant, David Vasquez, and Michael A. Katz appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiff. 
This matter arises out of an automobile accident occurring on October 6, 2000. On 
July 19, 2001, Plaintiff filed his complaint. Subsequently Defendant's insurer State Farm 
reached a settlement agreement with Plaintiff and paid him $4,650.06. On February 23, 
2001, Plaintiff filed a small claims action in the Third District Court in the amount of 
$1,227.35 for property damage as a result of the accident. On March 23, 2001, the court 
in the small claims action entered judgment against Plaintiff stating that there was "no 
Madsen v. Borthick , 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), sets forth the requirements for 
claims preclusion under res judicata: 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only if the suit in which that 
cause of action is being asserted and the prior suit satisfy three 
requirements. First, both cases must involve the same parties or their 
privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have 
been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should 
have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 247, 247 (Utah 1988). 
Applying the aforementioned to the facts of this case, it is undisputed the first 
requirement in Madsen is met. As for the second factor, the Restatement of Judgments 
§ 24 provides: 
The rule stated in this Section as to splitting a claim is applicable 
although the first action is brought in a court which has no jurisdiction 
to give a judgment for more than a designated amount. When the 
plaintiff brings an action in such a court and recovers judgment for the 
maximum amount which the court can award, he is precluded from 
thereafter maintaining an action for the balance of his claim ... it is 
assumed here that a court was available to the plaintiff in the same 
system of courts. 
In the instant matter, while exceeding the jurisdiction of the small claims court, there 
is no dispute the personal injuries and expenses related thereto were already incurred and 
should have been brought together - even if they had to be filed in district court. 
Furthermore, although the small claims court found there was "no cause of action," 
plaintiff could not re-file his action and he failed to appeal. Consequently, this decision is 
one on the merits and not based solely on jurisdiction as argued by plaintiff. 
3 
The Court, having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits attached thereto, 
and for good cause shown and based upon the foregoing including the Court's 
Memorandum Decision of March 25, 2002, it is hereby ORDERED: 
1. Defendants motion for summary judgment is granted. 
DATED this o day of ^jtf^T , 2002. 
BY THE 
The Honorable Glenn K.|iw2rsfKi^,^
 f 




Client N a m e : I l i a D e n i l i s Caser: 8220 DateLoss: 0 06 2000 
Provider ro\ Invs ServiceDate Service Amount 
ALTA VIEW HOSPITAL 
DRAPER CITY AMBULANCE 
PRESCRIPTIONS 
PRESCRIPTIONS 
NAVARRO BENNETT, MD 
PRESCRIPTIONS 
CALANDRA JOSEPIICPT 
CALANDRA, JOSEPH C , PT 
CALANDRA JOSEPH C . PT 
CALANDRAJOSEPHC.PT 
GRANGE. TIMOTHY S , M D 
HEALTHSOUTH 
CALANDRA, JOSEPH C , PT 
CALANDRA, JOSEPH C . PT 
NAVARRO, BENNETT, MD 
CALANDRA, JOSEPH C , PT 
CALANDRA. JOSEPH C , PT 
CALANDRA, JOSEPH C , PT 
CALANDRA JOSEPH C PT 
CALANDRA, JOSEPH C , PT 
GRANGE, TIMOTHY S , M D 
CALANDRA JOSEPH C , PT 
REGISTERED PHYSICAL THERAPISTS. 
REGISTERED PHYSICAL THERAPISTS, 
REGISTERED PHYSICAL THERAPISTS, 
GRANGE, TIMOTHY S . M D 
PRESCRIPTIONS 




REGISTERED PHYSICAL THERAPISTS, 
PRESCRIPTIONS 



































































NEURONTIN 600 MG 
COMPREHENSIVE EXAM 



























H>*S1 0 0 




$ 15 00 
S330 00 
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